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Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between the quality of political and
economic institutions and the performance of the infrastructure industries
reform process in developing countries. Our point of departure is that, when
thinking about this relationship, it is necessary to take into account the
specific features of these countries’ economies (Gasmi and Recuero Virto,
2005, Laffont, 2005). Based on two econometric analysis of time-series-cross-
sectional data on the telecommunications sector, we present the empirical
findings and policy implications pertaining two issues (Gasmi et al., 2006,
Gasmi and Recuero Virto, 2007). The first issue concerns the impact of
the quality of institutions on the performance of regulation. Our review
points to the fact that political accountability of institutional systems is a
key determinant of regulatory performance. The second issue relates to the
factors that shape the sectorial reforms themselves and the impact on these
reforms on the development of the industry. Our main conclusion is that
countries’ institutional risk and financial constraints are among the major
factors that explain which reforms are actually implemented.
JEL-codes: L51, H11, L96, L97, C23





For more than two decades now, a worldwide wave of reforms has been re-
shaping the landscape of infrastructure industries both in their market struc-
ture and in the institutions that govern them. In developed countries, these
reforms mainly sought to improve industry performance by introducing com-
petition in some selected segments and redesigning the legal and regulatory
framework so as to enhance diversification and quality of service, efficiency,
and pricing. Although based on the same fundamental principles, these re-
forms faced a significantly different context in developing countries. Indeed,
these countries were typically characterized by not only poor infrastructures
and weak economic conditions, but also and more importantly by severely in-
adequate administrative rules at both the sectorial and economy-wide levels
inherited from the pre-reforms era. An important methodological implica-
tion then is that when evaluating the performance of regulation in a given
infrastructure sector, both regulatory governance, that is, governance within
the sector, and more global factors related to the governance of the economy
as a whole should be account for. A first objective of this paper is to dis-
cuss the relative weight of these sectorial and economy-wide factors in the
determination of regulatory performance.
Two streams of literature stand at the forefront when thinking about
the determinants of regulatory performance in infrastructure industries. A
first stream, empirical, emphasizes the impact of regulatory governance on
performance (Cubbin and Stern, 2005). Another stream, rather conceptual,
argues that when investigating regulatory performance in infrastructure sec-
tors the relevant game to consider takes place upstream at the (higher) level
of politics (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). Our general view is that indeed the
relationship between political and regulatory structures and processes has to
be given due attention when assessing regulatory performance. This leads
us to suggest an approach that merges the above two streams of literature
by assuming that political accountability is the fundamental factor through
which the economic institutions of a country impact the performance of sec-
torial regulatory institutions. An econometric analysis of two data sets on
the telecommunications industry, one on developing countries and another
on developed countries, allows us to illustrate this link and to give some
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empirical substance to the conjecture that political accountability enhances
regulatory performance and more so in developing countries.
In addition to insufficient deployment of infrastructure and difficulties in
the functioning of institutions, developing countries are often characterized
by poor macroeconomic conditions. Both the structuration of sectoral re-
forms, in terms of their number, design, and timing, and their impact on the
performance of the infrastructure industry, are subject to these constraints.
Hence, the market reform conjuncture is not only conditioned by sectoral
factors, but also by institutional and macroeconomic factors affecting the ef-
ficiency of institutional rules such as the corruption engrained in the political
system, and the financial situation often constrained in developing countries
by, among other things, high debt services and inefficient taxation. A second
purpose of this paper is to explore both the impact of the sectoral reforms
on the deployment of infrastructure and the conditions that lead to specific
reforms and that allow them to proliferate.
The impact of sectoral reforms on the deployment of infrastructure in de-
veloping countries has largely been addressed by an empirical stream of the
literature.1 However, the determinants of these reforms have been mainly ex-
plored at the theoretical level.2 There is room then for bringing the lessons
from this theoretical literature to the empirical analysis of the role of re-
forms in the development of infrastructure in the developing countries. By
means of an econometric analysis of a data set on the telecommunications
industry in developing countries, we explore the impact of sectoral reforms
on fixed-line deployment, and we discuss, in line with a series of theoretical
hypothesis derived from the literature, the role of infrastructure deployment,
the institutional risk, and the cost of public funds in the privatization and
competition decisions, and in the decision to create a separate regulator.
Cellular competition in the analogue and in the digital segments are an-
alyzed separately and indeed empirical evidence on the timing of their intro-
duction and on their market implications suggests such a separate analysis.
In addition, the empirical analysis emphasizes the two-way causal relation-
ship between sectoral reforms and infrastructure deployment. Indeed, re-
1See Fink et al. (2002) for an overview of this stream of literature.
2See Auriol and Picard (2004), Warlters (2004), Laffont (2005), Emerson (2006), and
Evans et al. (2005).
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forms are likely to be endogenous to deployment, particularly in early stages
of privatization and competition reforms.3 Moreover, the creation of a sepa-
rate regulator may also depend on conditions characterizing the periods prior
to the introduction of regulation.4
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data
sets and the econometric methodologies used in our analysis. In section 3
we first present the empirical results on the role of political accountability
on regulatory performance with two data sets on the telecommunications
industry on developing countries and developed countries. We then discuss
our empirical findings on the determinants of sectoral reforms and on the
impact of these reforms on the deployment of infrastructure with a data set on
the telecommunications industry on developing countries. We conclude with
a summary of our main findings and a discussion of some policy implications.
2 Data and econometric methodology
In this section, we give a brief account of the data and the econometric
methodology used to empirically analyze the role of political and economic
institutions in the development of the telecommunications sector in develop-
ing countries.
The first study concerning the impact of the quality of institutions on
the performance of regulation (Gasmi et al., 2006) is based on a set of re-
gressions performed with two time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data sam-
ples, one containing information on 29 developing countries and another on
23 developed countries, and both covering the 1985-1999. In each of these
regressions, the dependent variable measures regulatory performance. More
specifically, regulatory performance is measured by a variable of output (pen-
etration rate of fixed-line telephone service or number of subscribers to cel-
lular service), efficiency (number of fixed-lines per employee), or price (the
monthly subscription to fixed telephone service for residential consumers or
the price of a 3-minute cellular call during peak hours).
3For instance, licences are often granted conditional on the fulfillment of targets of
penetration rates and quality and associated with exclusivity periods.
4Gutierrez (2003), Ros (1999, 2003) already point out the potential endogeneity of
telecommunications reforms.
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As to the explanatory variables, they include variables describing the
standard reform instruments, namely, privatization (% of the incumbent fixed
service operator’s assets privatized) and competition (degree of competition
in the fixed and cellular segments), and some variables conveying general
information on demand (population density and % of population which is
rural). For the purpose of this paper, however, we focus on those variables
used to capture political accountability. These explanatory variables of in-
terest are regrouped into “local political accountability” and “global political
accountability” variables.
The “local” part of political accountability indicates the state of gov-
ernance within the telecommunications sector and is captured in variables
indicative of the political and financial independence of the regulator, the
transparency of accounts and regulatory decisions, the clarity of the alloca-
tion of tasks among alternative regulatory institutions, the nature of the legal
environment, and the degree of social participation in regulatory decisions.
As to the “global” part of political accountability, it refers to the state of
governance in the economy as a whole. This is captured in variables reflect-
ing the quality of the institutional framework, namely, government integrity,
efficiency of bureaucracy, strength of courts and enforcement capacity, gov-
ernment’s commitment capacity, and currency risk, and the quality of the
political process inferred from the strength of checks and balances.
The second study seeking to investigate the determinants of sectoral re-
forms and their impact on telecommunications infrastructure deployment
(Gasmi and Recuero Virto, 2007) is based on a series of regressions performed
with data collected on 86 developing countries for the period 1985-1999.
When running these regressions, a key point is to account for the endogene-
ity of some right-hand-side variables, in particular, of the variable capturing
infrastructure deployment when explaining the sectoral reform variable and of
the reform variable when explaining the infrastructure deployment variable.
The reform variable describes the reform instrument that has been imple-
mented, namely, privatization of the incumbent, introduction of competition
in the fixed-service segment, introduction of competition in the analogue
and digital cellular segments (number of granted licences), and creation of a
separate regulator. The infrastructure deployment variable used is the pene-
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tration rate of fixed service. Among the other variables of the regressions, a
particular attention is given to those that measure the quality of the institu-
tional framework (all the variables described above except currency risk) and
the ease of government access to public funds. The latter is assessed through
the marginal cost of public funds which is parameterized using variables of
debt service, taxation, and international aid.5 Finally, some additional vari-
ables are used to control for the effect of human capital availability in the
sector, state of democracy in the country, perceived country risk, and popu-
lation density and distribution in the country.
We apply two different econometric estimation methods according to
whether the dependent variable is continuous (regulatory performance/infra-
structure deployment variables, privatization variable) or discrete (variables
of competition in the fixed, analogue cellular, and digital cellular segments,
creation of a separate regulator). In the continuous case, we make use of
the Differenced and System Generalized Method of Moments which is appro-
priate for dealing with dynamics and potential endogeneity of explanatory
variables, two features of our TSCS data (Arellano and Bond, 1991, and
Arellano and Bover, 1995). In order to avoid the weak instrument problem
and more generally the risk of inaccurate results, previously to performing
the regressions, dependent variables are stationarized when there is presence
of unit roots in the series.
In the discrete case, we apply the Complementary Log Log estimator
based on the grouped duration methodology (Beck et al., 1998). This method-
ology allows to deal with temporal dependence and multiple events as in the
case of our cellular competition variables since several licences where typi-
cally granted during the period under study. Moreover, the problem of the
potential endogeneity of the explanatory regressors is first addressed by an
exogeneity test based on the Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood
method and then, when needed, by an estimator, the Full Information Max-
imum Likelihood, that allows for the presence of endogenous regressors.
While the estimation of the coefficients of these (continuous/discrete)
regressions allows us to assess the quantitative impact of the explanatory
5The cost of public funds has been shown in the literature to be an important determi-
nant of telecommunications policy (Auriol and Picard, 2004, Gasmi et al. 1998, Warlters,
2004).
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variables on the dependent variables, asking first whether there exists a causal
relationship between some series of interest allow us to meaningfully interpret
this impact. We test whether the variables that proxy political accountability
“Granger-cause” those that proxy regulatory performance, and retain for
our regressions only those series where causality is found (Holtz-Eakin et
al., 1988). Moreover, we test whether there is a two-way causal relationship
between the variables used to proxy sectoral reforms and those used that
proxy infrastructure deployment, and again retain only those where causality
is found.
3 Empirical results and implications
Causality
As mentioned in the previous section, before performing the econometric
estimation of the relationship between political accountability and regulatory
performance, on the one hand, and reforms and network deployment, on the
other hand, we first investigate the existence of causal relationships between
the variables of interest.
For the data on 29 developing countries and the one on 23 developed
countries, we set a Granger-causality testing procedure asking whether po-
litical accountability causes regulatory performance. The tests performed
support the proposition that, in both developing and developed countries,
there exists a causal relationship between political accountability and reg-
ulatory performance. This relationship is particularly apparent when the
quality of the institutional environment is the variable used to measure po-
litical accountability. Another interesting feature of the results is that the
global accountability variables, that is, those that reflect the governance of
the economy as a whole, are in a stronger causal relationship with regulatory
performance than the local accountability variables that reflect sectoral reg-
ulatory governance. This result appears even more in developing countries.
For the data on 86 developing countries, we investigate the existence of
a two-way Granger-causality between sectoral reforms (privatization, com-
petition, and creation of a regulator) and infrastructure (penetration rate).
Evidence of both two-way and one-way causality relationships comes out of
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the data. We find that the creation of a separate regulator impacts fixed-
line penetration but is also conditioned by it, a result also discussed by Ros
(2003) and Gutierrez (2003). A similar two-way causality relationship is
found between the variable that indicates the introduction of competition in
the cellular digital segment and the one that indicates fixed-line penetration.
For the remaining reform instruments, we find one-way causal relationships.
Privatization of the fixed-line incumbent and introduction of competition in
the analogue segment both cause fixed-line deployment. Finally, deployment
of fixed-line service causes the introduction of competition in the fixed local
segment.
Estimation
The estimations provide strong evidence that in developing countries,
the higher the political accountability, the better the regulatory performance
as reflected in higher output (increase in fixed-line penetration and cellular
subscription), higher efficiency (increase in fixed-lines per employee), or lower
prices (decrease in price of cellular).6 The results obtained with the data on
the developed countries are much more poorer. In fact, we find that a higher
level of political accountability translates into better regulatory performance
only through higher output (increase in cellular subscription) and lower prices
(decrease in price of fixed-line subscription).
Our findings also suggest there are reasons to believe that local political
accountability is generally a relevant determinant of regulatory performance
in both developing and developed countries. The higher the sectoral regu-
latory governance, the better the regulatory performance as reflected in the
developing countries data set through higher output (increase in fixed-line
penetration) and lower prices (decrease in price of fixed-line subscription
and in price of cellular). In the developed countries data set, the higher
the sectoral regulatory governance the better the regulatory performance as
translated in higher output (increase in cellular subscription).
The story is not so clear when it comes to global accountability. In the
6The only result obtained that might at first seem counterintuitive is that higher po-
litical accountability (less risk of expropriation for operators and stronger checks and bal-
ances) leads to a higher price of fixed-line subscription. However, this might in fact only
reflect the extent of tariff rebalancing that typically takes place in developing countries
during the early stages of the reforms.
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data set on developing countries, we found that the quality of the political
process and the institutional environment have a favorable effect on regula-
tory performance when the latter is measured by any of the variables mea-
suring output, price, and efficiency. In fact, this effect is even stronger than
for local political accountability. In contrast, with the data set on developed
countries the quality of the political process has only been found to have
a significant impact on regulatory performance when the latter is measured
by output (increase in cellular subscription). Moreover, the quality of the
institutional environment showed a positive effect on regulatory performance
when the latter is measured by price (decrease in price of fixed-line subscrip-
tion) but an ambiguous effect when regulatory performance is measured by
output.
Our regression results support the proposition that the deployment of
infrastructure is a relevant determinant of sectoral reforms. More specifi-
cally, the higher the fixed-line penetration, the more likely the presence of
cellular competition in the digital segment and of fixed-line competition in
the local segment, while the less likely the creation of a separate regulator.7
We can then infer that the government is more likely to introduce cellular
competition in the digital segment and fixed-line competition in the local
segment when the telecommunications sector is performing well, since under
these circumstances higher licence fees can be expected. A separate regula-
tor , however, appears to be created with the aim of compensating a badly
performing sector.
We also find that institutional quality is an important determinant of
reforms. On the one hand, the weaker the institutional environment, the less
likely to find reforms such as cellular competition in the analogue segment
and the creation of a separate regulator.8 On the other hand, the weaker the
institutional environment, the more likely it is to find privatization of the
fixed-line incumbent, cellular competition in the digital segment, and fixed-
line competition in the local segment.9 It seems as though the higher the
7These results confirm the proposition of Evans et al. (2005) that regulatory indepen-
dence becomes more necessary the larger the returns to investment and hence, the lower
the fixed-line penetration.
8This result is in line with the hypothesis of Emerson (2006) that corruption has a
negative impact on competition decision.
9Results support Laffont’s (2005) proposition that the probability of infrastructure
9
expected price of the licence and, in general, the greater the probability of at-
tracting investors whose rents can be extracted, the more likely a government
with a poor institutional profile is going to promote the reform.10
Through the variables used to parameterize it, namely, debt, taxes, and
aid, the cost of public funds also appears to be a relevant determinant of
sectoral reforms. On the one hand, we find that the higher the cost of public
funds, the more likely to see privatization of the fixed-line incumbent and
cellular competition in the digital segment.11 On the other hand, the higher
the cost of public funds, the less likely to have cellular competition in the
analogue segment and fixed-line competition. This results lead us to think
that more profitable reforms are likely to be selected when the government
is under tighter financial constraints, despite the lose of the future revenues
of the firm in the public sector, and of the associated monopoly profits.
Regarding the impact of sectoral reforms on the deployment of infras-
tructure, we find strong evidence in our data set on the positive impact of
privatization of the fixed-line incumbent on fixed-line penetration.12 Also,
our separate treatment of the analogue and digital segments allows us to
shed some light on the effect of the introduction of competition in these two
segments.13 While we do find that cellular competition in the digital seg-
ment has a significant and positive impact on fixed-line penetration, cellular
competition in the analogue segment is found to have a significant and neg-
ative impact on deployment. Therefore, fixed-line deployment and cellular
competition in the digital segment can be viewed as complement while fixed-
privatization should decrease in countries with little or extreme levels of corruption.
10While the privatization of the fixed-line incumbent and the introduction of competition
in the digital cellular and the fixed-line segments typically involve external investors, the
first licence in the cellular analogue segment, which often remains the sole licence issued
in this segment, is usually granted to the fixed-line incumbent.
11For a given tax system, increases in debt force the government to increase its revenue
requirement through increases in the tax level which in turn increases the cost of public
funds. Changes in net taxes on products and aid per capita have a direct impact on the
government funding requirements and are expected to be negatively correlated with the
cost of public funds.
12This result is in contrast with the literature which often reports an ambiguous impact
of privatization.
13The usual strategy in empirical studies is to use an aggregate index of competition
for the analogue and digital segments and the typical finding is a positive impact of
competition on fixed-line penetration.
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line deployment and cellular competition in the analogue segment can be
regarded as substitutes.14 Finally, we find that fixed-line competition in the
local segment and the creation of a regulator have both no significant impact
on fixed-line penetration.
4 Conclusion
The major point highlighted by this paper is the crucial role played by the
institutional and macroeconomic foundations that characterize a country in
the development of infrastructure industries. A no less major policy im-
plication of this point is that the ongoing debate on the (re)structuring of
infrastructure industries that has so far taken place mainly at a sectoral level
should now be moving onto incorporating general factors of the economy as a
whole. The significance of these factors call for a particularly subtle attitude
towards policy design in developing countries. On the one hand, this study
has emphasized that what we consider as a fundamental link between sectoral
and economy-wide institutions, political accountability, has a positive direct
impact on the performance of regulation. On the other hand, a country’s
institutional risk and financial constraints have a positive indirect impact on
the deployment of infrastructure, through the sectoral reforms put in place
by the government.
We find that political accountability, characterized through the quality of
the institutional environment and the political process, is a relevant determi-
nant of the performance of regulation. The higher the political accountabil-
ity, the better the regulatory performance. A consequence of this result is
that future reforms should not only devote attention to improving regulatory
governance (structural requirements), but should also pay much attention to
understanding the political context within which regulatory institutions will
be performing.
In developing countries, regulatory agencies have been strongly criticized
14This is consistent with the fact that analogue licences appeared before digital licences,
being often granted to the fixed-line incumbent in which case no strong competition be-
tween fixed and cellular segments could be expected. Moreover, capacity constraints asso-
ciated with the analogue technology typically limited the number of issued licences in that
segment as compared to the digital segment, which is often characterized by the presence
of multiple competitor in the period under study.
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since the late 90s as often failing to prevent crisis, or even worse, as con-
tributing to their development.15 Among the major criticisms has been their
failure to retain private investment.16 The discussion in this paper, however,
suggests that the performance of regulation should not only be attributed
to sectoral features in developing countries where political accountability is
at an early stage of development. For these countries, additional means and
resources from development partners should be directed towards promoting
good global governance which will in turn enhance regulatory performance.17
Next to factors of this global nature, namely, the institutional environ-
ment and the level of tightness of the government’s budget constraint, infras-
tructure deployment has also been discussed as an important determinant of
sectoral reforms in developing countries. In particular, in countries subject
to higher institutional risk and to tighter financial constraints, governments
are more likely to promote those reforms that attract a larger number of
investors whose rents can be in turn extracted through the licence price, red
tape, or else, such as the privatization of the fixed-line incumbent and the
introduction of cellular competition in the digital segment. For the same
reasons, these governments are less likely to support those reforms that are
likely to provide them with less cash, such as the introduction of competition
in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a regulator.
As it turns out, the “profitable” reforms promoted by these governments
are those that have a positive impact on infrastructure deployment. Overall,
this leaves us with the result that might somehow seem paradoxal that coun-
tries with poorer economic conditions and greater institutional risk are more
likely to support those sectoral reforms that do enhance infrastructure de-
ployment.18 This might partly help in understanding the impressive growth
15Some examples, are the privatization process in Ghana and Philippines and the com-
petition process in Senegal.
16According to the World Bank PPI database, investment rose from 0.9 million USD
in 1991 to 44 million in 1997 and then decreased systematically (except in 2000) until its
lowest level in 2004 with 12 million USD.
17In developed countries, as our results show, political accountability is already well
established and practiced through an effective use by the electorate of its votes as a sanc-
tioning tool. The focus therefore in those countries is more on regulatory governance.
18In Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2007), we find that the privatization of the fixed-line
incumbent and the introduction of competition in the digital cellular segment have a pos-
itive impact on fixed-line deployment. These same reforms are also found to be important
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of telecommunications deployment in Sub-Saharan Africa in the recent years.
drivers of cellular subscription growth as well.
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